University of Mississippi

eGrove
Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

2001

Comments on April 16, 2001 Exposure Draft by the AICPA
Professional Ethics Executive Committee’s proposal to Modernize
its Auditor Independence Rules and Interpretations
Arthur Siegel
Independence Standards Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Siegel, Arthur and Independence Standards Board, "Comments on April 16, 2001 Exposure Draft by the
AICPA Professional Ethics Executive Committee’s proposal to Modernize its Auditor Independence Rules
and Interpretations" (2001). Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams. 606.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc/606

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Association Sections, Divisions,
Boards, Teams by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact
egrove@olemiss.edu.

BOARD

By E-Mail and
Regular Mail

William T. Allen, Chairman
Director
Center for Law and Business
New York University
John C. Bogle
Founder
The Vanguard Group, Inc.
Stephen G. Butler, CPA
Chairman and CEO
KPMG LLP
Robert E. Denham
Partner
Munger, Tolles & Olsen LLP
Manuel H. Johnson
Co-Chairman and
Senior Partner
Johnson Smick
International
Philip A. Laskawy, CPA
Chairman and CEO
Ernst & Young LLP
Barry C. Melancon, CPA
President and CEO
American Institute of CPAs

June 2001
Ms. Lisa A. Synder
Director, Professional Ethics Division
AICPA
Harborside Financial Center
201 Plaza Three
Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881
Dear Ms. Snyder: Comments on April 16, 2001 Exposure Draft
The staff of the Independence Standards Board is pleased to have
the opportunity to comment on the AICPA Professional Ethics
Executive Committee’s proposal to modernize its auditor
independence rules and interpretations. Our comments reflect solely
the views of the ISB staff, and do not purport to represent the views
of the Board or of any individual Board members.
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 We agree with the Committee’s goal of minimizing differences
between the SEC and AICPA independence rules, generally
allowing distinctions only where cost-benefit considerations are
compelling. The recent codification by the SEC of most of the rules
into one document will go a long way in assisting firms and
practitioners to understand the independence rules applicable to
auditors of public companies. The new SEC rules, however, take
some study and use before one is familiar enough with the new
terminology and format to easily find the answer to a question.
Knowing that practitioners will have to spend this time familiarizing
themselves with the SEC rules, does it make sense to revise the
AICPA rules by forcing conforming changes into the old AICPA
rule format and perpetuating subtle differences in definition? It
would be a positive move forward, we suggest, for audit firms and
other interested parties to have one set of coherent rules to consult
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when researching the answer to an independence question, perhaps with shaded
paragraphs delineating additional restrictions that apply to auditors of public companies.
While more than one body would be maintaining these rules, they could be published in
one place – perhaps on an AICPA website for easy and universal accessibility.
 Page 4 – An additional compelling reason for modernizing the rules which should be
added to your list is that, particularly but not exclusively in the case of family
relationships and financial interests, the existing rules have had the perverse effect of
making the auditing profession a less desirable employment opportunity with very little
offsetting benefit of strengthened independence.
 Page 5 – The first sentence of the penultimate paragraph should be modified to clarify
that members only must comply with the more restrictive rules when auditing public
companies.
 We understand that you are considering a Basis for Conclusions section to explain the
final rules; we agree that would be helpful, and suggest that you include a threat analysis
supporting the Committee’s conclusions to provide auditors and other interested parties
with additional rationale for the new rules, which will help them apply the rules more
consistently.
Requests for Specific Comments
1.
We believe that the definition of covered member includes the appropriate
individuals and entities, but would use the SEC’s covered person term and groupings to
better achieve your harmonization goal. Subtle differences in language and definition
add unnecessary complexity to the rules.
2.
We also believe that the definition of individual in a position to influence the
attest engagement appropriately includes those individuals who can reasonably be
expected to influence the attest engagement, but repeat our comment above suggesting
elimination of subtle differences in language and definition between the AICPA and SEC
rules.
3.
Other senior officials, outside the financial reporting area, have the ability to
exercise influence over the contents of the financial statements, because their activities
and decisions have significant financial statement consequences. Therefore, the
definition of key position should be expanded to include, for example, the heads of major
functions (manufacturing, sales, marketing, etc.) and of major subsidiaries or divisions.
4.
We suggest the definition of significant influence refer to generally accepted
accounting principles, rather than APB 18, in case the guidance is changed and APB 18
withdrawn. The definition also should be modified to read “[a]n individual or entity has
significant influence over an entity if the individual or entity meets the criteria......”
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5.

We believe the prohibitions on acting as:




a promoter, underwriter, or voting trustee;
a director, officer, or employee, or in any capacity equivalent to that of a
member of management; or as
a trustee for a client pension or profit-sharing plan

should be extended to all professionals in the firm, rather than only to professionals in the
office of the lead engagement partner. The firm should not be auditing a company when
a firm professional – even from another office – is promoting the company or serving, for
example, as a director or officer. It creates both a bias that should be avoided and a major
appearance issue.
6.
The 5% ownership threshold (as opposed to an ownership level allowing
significant influence) was adopted by the ISB and the SEC to avoid the appearance
concern that would be raised by the proxy statement requirement to identify and disclose
ownership interests at that level or above. A 5% restriction should be imposed on
auditors of private companies too, although perhaps for different reasons. Obtaining an
investment in a private company usually involves negotiations with management or other
shareholders, or results from an employment relationship, and in either case a 5% or
greater interest should be of concern. Having the same test for public and private
company audits also has some appeal.
In addition, the proposal should be modified to prohibit two or more firm professionals
from having investments that collectively would allow them to exert significant influence
over an audit client if they were to act together. We would, however, consider this a
violation only when the investors knew of each other’s investments.
7.
We believe that the immediate family of engagement team members should not be
employed in any position at the client. The engagement team member should not have a
stake in protecting the employment of the immediate family member, whatever the
relative’s involvement with the financial statements. There is also the possibility of an
emotional attachment to the employer of a spouse or dependent that is inappropriate, and
employment of the engagement team’s immediate family members raises significant
appearance issues.
The exception allowing immediate family members of certain covered members to
participate in client-sponsored, employment-related retirement, savings, compensation or
similar plans implies that immediate family members of other covered members are
prohibited from doing so. We could not find that prohibition in the rules. The definition
of client does not include client-sponsored plans, and the definition of financial interests
does not include interests in these plans. Although we do not believe immediate family
members of engagement team members should be employed at the client in any position,
we would not object to their participation in a client-sponsored retirement plan (provided
such plan is normally offered to all employees in similar positions) if such employment is
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ultimately permitted. We would object to immediate family member investments in the
client via a retirement or similar plan, however, because the threat to the objectivity of
the related “covered member” would be too great, as would the appearance issue.
8.

Yes, we agree with the prohibition.

Other Comments
Definitions
 Joint closely held business investment – The definition needs the word “and” after
“member” to convey the notion that a joint investment is one where both a covered
member and the client (or its officers, directors, or stockholders that can exercise
significant influence) have a controlling investment as opposed to one where the client
and, for example, its officers and directors have control. In addition, the “individually
and in any combination” language is not technically correct, as it could be misconstrued
to mean an investment controlled by the client, for example, in which the covered
member does not invest.
Interpretation 101-1
 A.3 – An interest in a closely-held entity normally involves negotiations directly with
the entity or another shareholder of the entity, in contrast with the impersonal process of
buying stock in a traded company. Furthermore, by definition, the number of
shareholders in a closely-held entity is small, and shareholders often have frequent
opportunity or need for contact. Consequently, we believe the familiarity and selfinterest threats, as well as the appearance concern, are too strong to permit the firm or a
covered member to have any interests in a closely-held entity along with the client, a
director or officer of the client, or a shareholder who can exercise significant influence
over the client, regardless of materiality. We would distinguish between these joint
activities and situations where a client subsequently, and on its own, invests in a venture
in which a covered member already holds an interest.
Application of the Independence Rules to a Covered Member’s Immediate Family
 1.b.(i) – We believe materiality should be measured with respect to the net worth of
both the relative and the covered member. It is hard for us to imagine an investment that
is immaterial to the auditor biasing his or her judgment, even if it is material to the
relative. The auditor is more likely to assist a close relative financially than compromise
professional standards for an immaterial amount. Similarly, an investment that is
material to the auditor but of no consequence to the close relative is not likely to
influence the auditor. Such a dual test would avoid unnecessary independence issues
such as those involving investments of adult children or of wealthy siblings, without
compromising objectivity.
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 1.b.(ii) – We would modify the language to read “[e]nabled the close relative to
exercise significant influence or control over the client” to better clarify the intent.
Other Considerations
The language used here is excellent; the examples provided, however - close personal and
business relationships – in many cases pose a real threat to the auditor’s independence,
and are not merely appearance problems.
*****
If you would like to discuss any of these matters, please contact us.
Sincerely,

Arthur Siegel
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